Fine-Grained MSR Specifications for Quantitative Security Analysis

doi:https://doi.org/10.1184/r1/6605681

Fine-Grained MSR Specifications for Quantitative Security Analysis

Iliano Cervesato-2018-06-30-Research Showcase @ Carnegie Mellon University (Carnegie Mellon University)

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TL;DRAbstract

The traditional Dolev-Yao model of security limits attacks to “computationally feasible” operations. We depart from this model by assigning a cost to protocol actions, both of the Dolev-Yao kind as well as non traditional forms such as computationally-hard operations, guessing, principal subversion, and failure. This quantitative approach enables evaluating protocol resilience to various forms of denial of service, guessing attacks, and resource limitation. While the methodology is general, we demonstrate it through a low-level variant of the MSR specification language.

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The traditional Dolev-Yao model of security limits attacks to “computationally feasible” operations. We depart from this model by assigning a cost to protocol actions, both of the Dolev-Yao kind as well as non traditional forms such as computationally-hard operations, guessing, principal subversion, and failure. This quantitative approach enables evaluating protocol resilience to various forms of denial of service, guessing attacks, and resource limitation. While the methodology is general, we demonstrate it through a low-level variant of the MSR specification language.

Keywords

Computer sciencePrincipal (computer security)Protocol (science)Cryptographic protocolDenial-of-service attackResource (disambiguation)Model checkingResilience (materials science)

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