Three experiments on providing and valuing threshold public goods with alternative rebate rules

TL;DRAbstract

This dissertation considers the use of rebate rules in providing and valuing threshold public goods. Threshold public goods are also known as provision point, binary, or step-level goods because they cannot be provided in part, but only in whole after a certain cost (or threshold) is covered. Lighthouses, bridges, and specific plots of land for conservation programs represent examples of threshold public goods. Rebate rules govern the use of any excess contributions collected beyond the threshold cost. The fate of excess contributions can affect one's willingness to contribute to a public good. The original motivation for this study comes from a need to develop better real-money benchmarks from which to assess hypothetical bias in the contingent valuation method (CVM), whereby economists use written surveys to ask people how much they would hypothetically be willing to pay (WTP) to provide a public (environmental) good. The CVM is often criticized for being susceptible to hypothetical

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