The Strategic Politics of IMF Conditionality

TL;DRAbstract

Why do some IMF programs contain more conditions than others? In this paper, I offer a theoretical account of under what circumstances competing domestic political logics prevails over the other and explain why some IMF programs contain more conditions than others. The theoretical model shows that the effect of domestic politics on IMF program design depends on the interaction of three institutional parameters: sensitivity to vote losses; reform-mindedness of the government; and the strength of affected special interest groups. Specifically, the model yields the proposition that a government that is more sensitive to vote losses and less reformminded is more likely to extract a more lenient conditionality from the IMF. A government that is less sensitive to vote losses and more reform-minded is likely to pursue more extensive reforms siding with the IMF and is constrained by domestic politics only when there exist strong special interest groups that can hinder proper implementation of

Chat with Paper

AI Agents for this Paper