The Apport of modal cognition to information-based theories of rationality

TL;DRAbstract

Information-based theories of rationality offer a widely accepted system for evaluating the rationality of an agent's choice. All such models have to deal with seemingly irrational choices and with choices that do not reflect in actuality what the system predicts in theory. Hyperintensionality (where intensionality is not derived solely from an informational processing asymmetry, as, we will argue, in framing effects) doesn't find easy or natural solutions within the information-based framework provided by such theories. Such theories, that is, aim to solve the problems of intensionality and hyperintensionality by recourse to an information-based explanation – generally grounded in the concept of latent information: the agent regarded as salient and processed, as information, some information to which the experimenter or the theoretician was insensitive. We wish to spell out how some abilities peculiarly linked to modal cognition (i.e. our grasping of modal features such as possibility

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