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Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations

Ben Smyth,David Bernhard-2013-04-23-HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe)
6

TL;DRAbstract

We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and prove that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also prove that non-malleable ballots are sufficient for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy in a special case. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.

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We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and prove that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also prove that non-malleable ballots are sufficient for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy in a special case. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.

Keywords

BallotSecrecyIndependence (probability theory)Secret ballotPolitical scienceComputer securityLaw and economicsInternet privacy

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