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Autonomy, individuality and consent

Onora O’Neill-2002-04-18-Cambridge University Press eBooks
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TL;DRAbstract

Most contemporary accounts of autonomy see it as a form of independence. Independence is relational: it is independence from something or other. So we may reasonably ask from what autonomous persons and autonomous action are independent. Many sorts of action are independent in some respects but dependent in others, and some sorts of independence do nothing to show that an action is right or valuable. Some independent action is spontaneous, disciplined, altruistic and even heroic; some is self-centred, pig-headed, impulsive, random, ignorant, out of control and regrettable or unacceptable for these and many other reasons.

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Most contemporary accounts of autonomy see it as a form of independence. Independence is relational: it is independence from something or other. So we may reasonably ask from what autonomous persons and autonomous action are independent. Many sorts of action are independent in some respects but dependent in others, and some sorts of independence do nothing to show that an action is right or valuable. Some independent action is spontaneous, disciplined, altruistic and even heroic; some is self-centred, pig-headed, impulsive, random, ignorant, out of control and regrettable or unacceptable for these and many other reasons.

Keywords

Independence (probability theory)NothingAutonomyAction (physics)Social psychologyPsychologyEpistemologyLaw

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