Experiments on Collective Action

TL;DRAbstract

This dissertation employs experimental methods to investigate some of the non-material incentives that exacerbate and help groups resolve problems of collective action. It is composed of three studies that investigate what motivates individuals to contribute to public goods, what mechanisms can be used to encourage giving, and the aggregate collective action problem of dishonesty and corruption. Chapter 1 provides an overview of each study. Chapter 2 presents work conducted with Kelsey Jack, which investigates leadership within the context of voluntary public good provision. We conduct a field experiment in 52 communities in rural Bolivia to investigate two questions: (1) Can leaders enhance voluntary public good provision by making a public donation before others?, and (2) If so, why? We explore whether leaders give more when they have the opportunity to influence others, and whether their behavior influences the contributions of others. Some of the mechanisms behind leadership influe

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