The Form of the Maxim as the Determining Ground of the Will (<i>The Critique of Practical Reason</i>: §§4–6, 27–30)

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In the 'Analytic of Pure Practical Reason', Book I of the second The Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant undertakes to show that pure reason can be practical. Sections 4-6 are primarily concerned with the second, third, and fourth steps in an ultimately seven-part argument (with the concepts of pure form, universal legislation, and transcendental freedom, respectively). The fifth, sixth, and seventh steps of the overall argument (the 'fundamental law', the 'fact of reason', and the concept of 'autonomy', respectively), constitute the essential core of the 'Analytic'. In the first step of the ensuing argument Kant comes to negative conclusion that no maxims originate from an empirical will and the governing principle of an empirical will. The second step in Kant's demonstration consists in an argument e contrario. The determining ground of the free will lies in the legislating form contained in the maxim, in accordance with the third step.

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